Abstract In this paper, we critically review cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and the guard-rail approach as decision-support tools for the choice of climate protection strategies. Our main focus is on the central role of value judgments, which arise from the need to value; first, uncertain environmental benefits from climate protection relative to other goods; second, the consumption of the present relative to future generations; and third the consumption of``poor'' relative to``rich'' people. Each of the three approaches analyzed has its shortcomings. Cost-benefit analysis requires a complete and transitive preference ordering, which stands in sharp contrast to scientific uncertainties and valuation problems. Cost-effectiveness analysis suffers from the difficulty of setting an appropriate climate protection target. Finally, the usefulness of the guardrail approach for decision-makers depends on the extent to which it is possible to limit the choice set.
Introduction
Carbon dioxide absorbs radiation in a wavelength range that coincides with non-vanishing parts of the Earth's emission spectrum. This observation led to the fear that anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases might enhance the natural atmospheric greenhouse effect. The respective concern grew especially over the last 20 years, due to measurements that showed steadily increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere (cf. IPCC, 1996a, p. 16 ). Since the above mentioned fundamental empirical fact is undoubted, investigations of natural scientists mainly focused on the role of socalled feedback processes either damping (negative feedback) or enhancing (positive feedback) climate change. The main question from a natural science perspective therefore is not, whether global temperature will change or not, but by how many degrees it will change ± and whether this will be detectable. Using extensive and expensive super-computers, climatologists calculated that a significant change (compared with natural variability) could occur if we followed the projected business-as-usual emission path ± even if only a smooth evolution of the climate system were assumed and all possible climate instabilities were neglected.
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As a consequence of this finding, global climate change and the related risks entered the political agenda. But as soon as the need for abatement measures were realized, the focus shifted from the question``by how many degrees temperature would increase if we followed the business-as-usual policy path?'' to``by how much, when, and how emissions of greenhouse gases should be reduced and who should pay for it?' ' (cf. IPCC, 1996c ). While we do not address the last point throughout this paper (see e.g. Helm, 1998) , the standard economic tool for the other questions is cost-benefit analysis. Although the general idea of comparing the costs and benefits of different decision options in a systematic way is appealing to a wide audience, the actual application of cost-benefit analysis raises a number of thorny issues that lead to a highly controversial debate on its relevance for decision making on climate change, as witnessed for example in the rather critical chapter on cost-benefit analysis in the Second Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1996c) .
It is generally pointed out that even a benevolent international planner would face a number of severe problems in choosing a policy, which can be classified as being related to:
. scientific problems, either concerning the structure of models, which should capture the most important relations of complex natural and social systems, or data problems in the estimation of model parameters; and . value judgment problems, i.e. how one shall transform the scientific knowledge on climate change into a social decision about a protection strategy.
In this paper we will elaborate on the latter point: the ± often not explicitly stated ± value judgments involved in the aggregation of costs and benefits over impact categories, affected persons and time, which underlie many of the controversies regarding the application of cost-benefit analysis to climate change. Rather than discussing which value judgments are more appropriate than others, we will ask to what extent cost-benefit analysis is appropriate as a framework in which to make those judgments and also explore some alternatives which have been proposed in the context of climate change, in particular cost-effectiveness studies (e.g. Wigley et al., 1996) and the guard-rail approach (e.g. WBGU, 1996 WBGU, , 1997 To Âth et al., 1997) .
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we use stylized examples to illustrate some often voiced concerns regarding the application of cost-benefit analysis to climate change. Those points are then analyzed more systematically in the following sections. After a short introduction into the welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis (Section 3), we will discuss value judgments involved in the aggregation across uncertain impacts (Section 4), across agents (Section 5) and across time (Section 6). Finally, we will compare this with the role of value judgments for two alternative decision-support tools, namely cost-effectiveness studies (Section 7) and the guard-rail approach (Section 8).
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Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 976 2. Value judgments and cost-benefit analysis ± some stylized examples The DICE model (Nordhaus, 1991) , which is one of the most prominent models for the integrated assessment of climate change, as well as its regionalized version RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) aim to determine a carbon dioxide emission path that is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the discounted worldwide stream of abatement costs and monetized climate damages. The results of both models indicate that we should learn to adapt to a temperature increase of about 6ëC in the course of the next centuries if we intended to follow the proposed efficient policy path. Nordhaus himself admits that``it would make most thoughtful people ± even economists ± nervous to induce such a large environmental change'' (Nordhaus, 1997, p. 322) . A closer look at some specific effects which are hidden behind the sectoral, regional and intergenerational aggregation that led to this``optimal'' solution further aggravates this concern.
For example, the survey of impact studies by Fankhauser (1995) (see also IPCC, 1996c, p. 204) indicates that the additional number of deaths (due to heat waves alone) is projected to be in the order of 100,000 a year already in case of a temperature increase of only 2.5ëC [1] . Many observers might find this number of deaths not being properly reflected in the total damage cost estimates of about 1.3 per cent fractional loss of global output which correspond to this temperature increase in the DICE-model.
Similarly, one might criticize that assessments of global damage tend to average out potentially severe regional impacts. Already for a temperature rise of 2.5ëC, the overall impact of climate change is assessed to be in the range of 2-9 per cent of GDP for developing countries (IPCC, 1996c, p. 218) . Accordingly, the IPCC Second Assessment Report concludes that``impacts on developing countries are likely to be more severe relative to the wealth of these countries. In some cases, sea level rise alone results in dramatic impacts on the economies and may threaten the existence of whole communities and nation states'' (IPCC, 1996c, p. 213) . Despite these potentially large regional impacts, globally aggregated damage costs are usually in the order of less than 2 per cent of global GDP, information which representatives from developing countries especially might find much less relevant for decision making than the considerably higher impacts on their own countries.
Decision-makers from European countries, on the other hand, might worry about a possible instability of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation, the socalled conveyor belt phenomenon delivering huge amounts of heat to the Northeast Atlantic and keeping Western and Northern Europe much warmer then they otherwise would be. Comparing the projected temperature increase of the RICE model's optimal path with a stability criterion for the Atlantic thermohaline circulation yields that a permanent shut down of the conveyor belt cannot be excluded Schmittner, 1997a, 1997b) . Possible implications of such a break down are a decrease in the annual mean air temperature in the northern North Atlantic by up to 20ëC associated with Climate protection strategies 977 lowered winter temperatures by more than 30ëC. Consequently, the Norwegian Sea may be completely ice-covered in winter and the maximum sea-ice extent may even cover parts of the coasts of the British Isles (Schiller et al., 1997) . In principle, this is of course no argument against applied cost-benefit analysis, because the damage estimates in the RICE model could be extended to take account of these findings and would then possibly come to different results, even though assessing the potential economic impacts of such a dramatic temperature change would be extremely difficult. However, this emphasizes the importance of including all major climate change impacts in a cost-benefit study, while on the other hand our knowledge about those impacts is still very fragmented.
In addition, discounting might reduce even such extreme damages like the shut down of the conveyor belt into marginalities if they lie far enough in the future. To illustrate this effect, consider the following sensitivity experiment for the DICE model. Nordhaus (1994) introduces an extreme nonlinearity into the climate damage function so that damage costs are modest below 3 Ê C and rise sharply beyond this threshold to a value of 60 per cent of global output if temperature changes by 3.5 degrees. Note that under standard assumptions, a temperature change of about 3ëC would be realized according to the DICE model already at the end of the next century. The results of this experiment are ± on first sight ± surprising, because the potential catastrophe would change greenhouse policy in the early period only modestly. The reason is that due to the high productivity of capital, which is one of the rationales for discounting, the``investments to slow climate change should be postponed in favor of investments in conventional capital until the fateful threshold is relatively close'' (Nordhaus, 1994, p. 115) . Later on, the mitigation efforts rise sharply to keep society away from the threshold. So, in this scenario future generations would have to bear most of the burdens of climate change, either in the form of huge emission reduction costs or rapidly increasing climate change damages. Although one might argue that these future generations will probably be much richer than the present one, a rapid decline of GDP would induce severe social conflicts even for those richer generations.
It should be emphasized again that with these examples we did not intend to question the principle usefulness of integrated assessment models and costbenefit analysis as support tools for climate change decision making. In fact, their major strength may be that they provide a systematic framework to gather information and process them in a consistent way. However, one should be extremely careful to put too much trust in the thus derived policy recommendations. As has been nicely summarized in IPCC (1996c, p. 149):`P ractical application of cost-benefit analysis to climate change is difficult because of the global and intergenerational nature of the problem. It is further complicated by the difficulties of valuing some categories of ecological, cultural, and human health impacts''. Those will now be analyzed in more detail.
Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 978 3. The welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis While the market mechanism does an excellent job in allocating scarce resources in many cases, it fails in others. Two prominent characteristics that lead to market failures are externalities and public goods, which lie at the heart of the problem of climate change. This establishes the need for governmental intervention. Yet, while individuals on the market place simply have to follow their private preferences, political decision makers (at least if they are benevolent) face a much more difficult problem: they have to take into account the legitimate claims of all persons ± including those not yet born ± i.e. they have to aggregate individual preferences into social preferences.
Of course, the choice between different climate protection strategies is not only hampered by the difficulty of making value judgments involved in this aggregation process. In particular, the natural impact chain which relates emissions of greenhouse gases to climate impacts is understood only insufficiently, and also the costs of emission reductions are highly uncertain. In most of the paper we ignore these partially severe problems and assume that at least subjective probabilities can be attached to different outcomes so as to assure a complete ordering of individual preferences across different policy options. However, in Section 8 we will explore the consequences for decisionmaking if this assumption is given up. We also abstract from the struggles of the international negotiation process and pose the social choice problem as follows: if there were a benevolent world planner, what climate protection strategy should she choose?
The Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951) tells us that the prospects of making such a social choice on the basis of ordinal rational preferences are rather bad. Arrow shows that there is no Pareto efficient social choice mechanism satisfying the following two desirable conditions:
(1) independence of irrelevant alternatives, i.e. social preferences between any two alternatives should depend only on the individual preferences between the same two alternatives; and (2) non-dictatorship, i.e. there should be no agent who determines the social preference independent of the individual preference profiles of the other agents.
A number of approaches to circumvent the Arrow impossibility theorem have been suggested in the literature, for example to relax the assumption of full (economic) rationality or to restrict the analysis on single-peaked preferences. Cost-benefit analysis is based on another approach, namely of reverting to cardinal preference orderings, which attach a meaning to utility levels and thereby allow interpersonal comparisons (and hence aggregation) of utility. Let us assume that there is a benevolent social planner. A natural objective for her would be to maximize social welfare:
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where u i are the individual agents' utility values, U is the utility possibility set and W u 1 Y XXXY u n is a social welfare function which describes the way how individuals' utilities are aggregated into social utilities.
Cost-benefit analysis allows decisions to be made on individual projects even in a rather imperfect world, which is miles away from the bliss point of the welfare maximum. Roughly speaking, its idea is that a project ± like a particular climate protection strategy ± should be undertaken if it increases social welfare W and rejected else. If there are many, mutually exclusive projects, the one which leads to the highest increase in social welfare should be chosen. However, making such a choice involves two controversial steps: first, we have to determine how a project affects the utility of each individual and express those changes in a way which allows interpersonal comparisons. Second, we have to deduce the change in social welfare implied by all the changes in the individuals' utility. It is in those two steps, which will be addressed in turn, where value judgments inevitably enter the stage.
Utility changes are not directly observable. On the other hand, to compare a project's effects across different individuals, we have to agree on a common standard of comparison. Using money measures for individual utility changes is a convenient way to tackle these problems, though not necessarily the only one. The two money measures most frequently used are compensating variation CV and equivalent variation EV . Compensating variation gives the amount of money that can be taken away from a household after the project so that it is exactly as well off as before the project had been undertaken. If an agent gains from a project, this is his willingness-to-pay for the project. If an agent looses from a project, this is his willingness-to-accept compensation for the deterioration of his situation. For environmental problems this can be expressed formally as
where # is the indirect utility as a function of income y and environmental quality z (prices have been suppressed), and the superscripts 0 and H signify the situation before and after the project respectively [2] . Accordingly, a project should be undertaken if the money measures indicate that it leads to an increase in social welfare, i.e. if, concentrating on compensating variation CV (equation 2)
is the marginal social utility of income of household i (cf. Johansson, 1993) [3].
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Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 980 4. Aggregation across uncertain impacts: value judgments at the level of individuals Turning from the mere conceptual idea of money measures towards their empirical specification and interpersonal comparison is anything but an easy exercise. Among the most important impact categories of climate change are effects on human health and mortality, ecosystem damages like wetland, forest and species loss, damages from extreme events like storms, floods and droughts, migration etc. To a large extent, these impacts concern intangibles, i.e. goods which are not traded in markets, and, furthermore, the extent of those impacts is highly uncertain. Thus, the usual approach of economists to infer values from evidence based on actual market behavior is often not feasible.
One possibility to monetize those hard-to-value, non-pecuniary costs is to do so indirectly via implicit markets. For example, the willingness-to-pay for national parks and the ecosystems they protect are sometimes approximated from people's travel costs of visiting those parks. Similarly, if two property sites differ only in their susceptibility to flooding, the monetary value of this difference in risk of flooding could be inferred from differences in property values (e.g. Hanley and Spash, 1993) .
The alternative method to attach monetary values to intangibles is contingent valuation surveys. In this method, questionnaires are used to directly elicit individuals' values for the respective goods. For example, a representative sample of people might be asked whether they are willing to accept a certain cost for the prevention of a particular impact, and this information can then be used to estimate demand functions (cf. Portney, 1994; Hanemann, 1994) .
Although both methods can provide highly valuable information, they also have their shortcomings. Often people attach a value to the mere knowledge that rare ecosystems are protected in national parks, without intending to ever visit them. These``existence values'' (Krutilla, 1967) would not be reflected in estimates derived by the travel cost method. Furthermore, the monetization of intangible values via implicit markets depends on the possibility to isolate those parts of the market behavior that reflect the values one is interested in. For example, one will rarely find property sites which differ only in their risk of flooding.
Contingent valuation surveys, on the other hand, depend on individuals stated responses to hypothetical questions. Therefore, payments are only symbolic and respondents might not reflect them carefully. Furthermore, as people do not carry their utility function engraved in their brains, respondents' ability to state their willingness-to-pay for a particular object requires that they are well informed and at least to some extent familiar with the situation described in the hypothetical question. This problem may be particularly severe if one attempts to elicit respondents willingness-to-pay for an impact that will not occur with certainty but only with a certain probability. Nevertheless, such information is important, because neglecting people's risk attitude might severely bias results.
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Beyond those principle difficulties of eliciting individual agents' valuation for intangibles, the problem is further aggravated by the fact that climate change is likely to affect almost everyone in a multitude of aspects. Inclusion of all these impacts, or even just the most important ones, would prove extremely difficult. Therefore, it is not surprising that most cost-benefit studies on climate change rely on highly simplified damage cost functions, which are based in only a rather loose way on more elaborate impact studies (cf. the survey in Schellnhuber and Yohe, 1997).
Aggregation across agents: value judgments at the intragenerational level
After having elicited people's valuation for the avoidance of climate change impacts, the next step is to aggregate those (monetized) individual preferences into social preferences. In other words, one has to decide how much to value a project's effects on different persons relative to each other. Although the precise aggregation rule to be used is highly controversial, there are nevertheless some properties which are generally regarded as minimum requirements for any social welfare function. The first criterion is welfarism or nonpaternalism, which means that social preferences should depend only on the individual utility levels, i.e. the social planner has no direct preferences on the alternatives. Second, the social welfare function should satisfy the Pareto criterion so that an increase in the utility level of every individual also improves social welfare. The third property is called anonymity or symmetry and asserts that all agents should be treated equally in the sense that for the evaluation of social welfare only the frequencies of different utility levels matter, but not who enjoys a high or low level of utility. Finally, the social welfare function is usually required to be concave, similar to individual utility functions. While for individual agents the concavity of utility functions signifies the degree of risk aversion, in the context of social welfare functions it rather represents the degree of inequality aversion [4] . Yet, these four properties still leave a wide range of possible specifications of the social welfare function.
If the global income distribution were in a welfare optimum, the problem of valuing a project's effect on different people would be alleviated considerably. Because in the optimum marginal social utility of income must be equal across all agents, equal effects (measured in income changes like compensating variation) should be valued equally independent of to which agent they accrue [5] . This means, for example, if a project improves the welfare of 51 per cent of the world population by US-$1 and decreases the welfare of the other 49 per cent by US-$1, it should be undertaken. This is the way many cost-benefit studies on climate protection strategies proceed: effects are monetized and then a cost-benefit decision criteria, which usually ignores to whom the effects accrue, is applied (but see Fankhauser et al., 1997) .
However, the underlying assumption that income is distributed such that the world is in a global welfare optimum seems rather daunting. In particular, while on the national level governments usually have instruments ± like taxes ± International Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 982 at their disposal to improve the income distribution, on the international level no comparable decision-making authority with similar redistribution instruments exists. Therefore, it would be hard to argue that the international income distribution reflects social preferences. Now, if a decision is not made from the position of a global welfare optimum, marginal social utility of income will differ among agents and a global planner would have to decide how she values the effects of a project on different agents relative to each other. The possible range of value judgments can be illustrated with different types of social welfare functions (SWF), whose indifference curves have shapes which are well-known from private consumer and producer theory (e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Fankhauser et al., 1997) .
The social indifference curves depicted in Figure 1 (a) correspond to a utilitarian SWFW i u i y i , where the marginal social welfare of utility is equal across all agents. The utilitarian SWF neglects distributionary aspects insofar as extremely unequal utility allocations ± like the endpoints of the indifference curves in Figure 1 (a) ± would be represented by the same welfare index W , as long as the sum of the utility levels remains constant. However, this does not imply indifference towards the income distribution, because the marginal utility of income can be assumed to be higher in poorer countries, i.e. in Equation (3) we have dW adu i 1 for all i, but du i ady i depends on income levels. Neglecting the production side of the economy ± as we generally do in this paper ± global welfare maximization would require marginal utility to be equalized in all countries, thereby supporting a rather egalitarian wealth distribution. This is illustrated by the point of tangency between the indifference curve and the utility possibility set (UPS) in Figure 1(a) .
The second example in Figure 1 (b) gives the indifference curves of the Bernoulli-Nash SWFW i ln u i y i . Here, utility improvements for the worse off agents have a greater effect on social welfare than those for the better off agents, because dW adu i 1au i depends on individual utility levels. The stronger the curvature of the graph, the bigger the inequality aversion.
If the curvature tends towards infinity, the indifference curves correspond to those of a maximin SWFW minfu 1 y 1 Y XXXY u n y n g, depicted in Figure  1 (c). In this case, it is only the worst off group in the community who determines the social welfare level, i.e. dW adu i 1 for the worst off individual and dW adu i 0 for all others. This social welfare function is often termed Rawlsian because of its close correspondence to Rawls``difference principle'', according to which inequalities can only be justified if they improve the conditions for the worst off individual (Rawls, 1971 In summary, cost-benefit analysis does not only allow to express value judgments regarding the marginal social welfare of income increases for different agents, but actually forces analysts to do so. Probably in order to avoid such difficult judgments, nearly all applied cost-benefit studies on climate change proceed as if income were distributed optimally, an assumption that is hard to defend, especially regarding the international income distribution.
One reason for this might be missing data on the marginal social welfare of income. There exists a number of empirical estimates for the marginal (private) utility of income, which are derived from observed consumer behavior (cf. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) . There also exist some, though not as many attempts to estimate a social welfare function for a particular country (e.g. Yunker, 1989) . However, empirical estimation of an international social welfare function from observed behavior seems nearly impossible, simply because agents make no decisions with which they could reveal their preferences regarding the international distribution of income.
One can, of course, still ask decision-makers for their personal social welfare function, or what they think a social welfare function that represents the preferences of the world's population would look like, and use this as input for a cost-benefit study. Similarly, one can identify the value judgments (e.g. as values for the parameter &) with which a project should be rejected and with which it should be accepted, while holding all other elements constant. However, the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis as a decision-making tool for climate change will always be hampered by the difficult value judgment of how to aggregate private into global preferences. Nowhere has this become clearer than in the debates about the monetary value of a statistical life in rich versus poor countries, which has a great effect on cost-benefit results (cf. Fankhauser, 1995) . Because the willingness to pay for a decreased risk in mortality depends on income, poorer people usually state lower values. Even though it has been shown above that social welfare functions can correct those values in the process of interpersonal aggregation, the appropriate specification of a social welfare function is highly controversial.
International
Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 984 6. Aggregation across time: value judgments at the intergenerational level The bulk of public policy projects imply costs and benefits accruing to different agents in different time periods. In most cases, however, the time horizon of the project is on the order of a few years to a decade or two (dams being a frequently mentioned exception). In contrast, climate change policy is related to a global public good of which benefits arise many decades or even centuries later than costs. It is not surprising, therefore, that the global warming debate provided new impetus and brought about new turns in the discounting controversy (see, for example, Manne, 1995; Schelling, 1995; Lind, 1995; To Âth , 1995) .
The underlying rational for discounting is largely based on empirical observations, simple and well understood. On the consumption side: people tend to favor immediate consumption over future consumption even if one disregards risks and other relevant uncertainties. This enticement clashes with the temptation from the production side: deferring consumption and investing productive resources yields more consumption possibilities in the future.
Considering the first component at the society's level, the social time preference involves three factors: the pure rate of time preference (the impatience factor), the growth of real per capita consumption over time, and the declining marginal utility of this growing consumption. Correspondingly, on the production side, the social rate of return to capital reflects the social opportunity cost of any proposed public policy project.
Systematic analyses of these concepts often use the optimal growth modeling framework first formulated by Ramsey (1928) . These models take capital and labor as inputs and maximize the social value of the future consumption stream. In this representation of an ideal world, the social rate of time preference (observed from the consumption rate of interest) and the opportunity cost of private capital (observed from the marginal rate of return on private investment) are equal and they are both equal to the market rate of interest. The intuition behind this is that in the optimum the loss from postponing current consumption should equal the gain from the corresponding increase in capital available for investments to increase future consumption. Once the assumptions about ideal conditions are abandoned, however, the social rate of time preference and the marginal rate of return on private investments diverge due to market imperfections, notably corporate profit tax and personal income tax.
The picture is clear and there is wide agreement as long as we hold the assumption about perfect economy. Once this assumption is relaxed, a huge basket of controversial items arise and this gives ample opportunity to squeeze in one's own value judgments (hidden or revealed).
As for the practical solution, several proposals are around. One calls for determining the distributional effects of the project at hand by calculating it for various discount rates and leave it up to the choice of policymakers to decide according to their value judgment. Another proposal is to observe Climate protection strategies 985 policymakers' revealed discount rate implied by previously instituted policies. Results will probably be rather inconsistent but at least provide a spread of implicit discount rates.
Taking a descriptive approach and searching for the appropriate discount rate in a world with distortionary taxes, Lind (1982) developed what was the dominant discounting technique for cost-benefit analyses throughout the 1980s. Lind first established an analytical framework to separate the issues of time preference and the opportunity cost of public investments. He argued that the social rate of discount should be equal to the social rate of time preference as determined by the consumption rate of interest. The basis for its numerical estimation are the returns on market instruments that are available to investors. The effects on private capital formation should be accounted for by using a conversion technique and the concept of the``shadow price'' of capital. This latter represents``the present value of the future stream of consumption benefits associated with US-$1 of private investment discounted at the social rate of time preference'' (Lind, 1982, p. 39) . This way, effects on capital formation are converted to their consumption equivalents through the use of the shadow price of capital. Finally, a single rate of discount, the consumer's rate of interest, is applied to the benefit and cost streams.
A practical difficulty of the``shadow price of capital'' approach is that to compute it one needs to know the marginal rate of return on private capital, the marginal rate of taxation on capital income, rates of depreciation and reinvestment, the consumer's rate of interest, and the marginal propensity to save. One can conclude that while the Lind approach is extremely useful and elegant in consolidating capital-market distortions, it is impossible to apply. The practical obstacle arises from the need to account for all flows in and out of consumption and investment, which requires a much deeper understanding of their governing forces than is currently the case.
It is obvious that the Ramsey-based discounting is a special case of the consumption-equivalent technique. In the absence of distortions, all shadow prices are equal to one, so there is no need to convert investment expenditures into consumption equivalents before a uniform discount rate can be applied.
In his amendment of the consumption-equivalent technique, Lind (1990) revisited the government's discount rate policy for public projects in light of new observations on international capital mobility, the effects of financing government deficit on crowding out private investments, and in behavioral economics on the individual's rate of time preference. His most important conclusion relevant to the problem of climate change (and long-term policies in general) is that intergenerational resource allocations should be based either on a utility function over time or on some other decision rule incorporating intergenerational equity. Lacking these, however, the government's long-term borrowing rate should be used in evaluating the effects of projects involving long-run intergenerational resource allocations.
More recently, Lind and Schuler (1996) have reexamined the consumption equivalent technique in the context of the global climate change problem and International Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 986 concluded that it was not appropriate for various reasons. Their main line of argument suggests that climate protection is basically provision of a global public good, partly to distant nations and partly to distant generations. Consequently, the basic questions are: how much transfer should be made and what form should it take. Lind and Schuler argue that the answers should consider the opportunity cost of investment: since conventional investment projects earn 5-8 per cent in developed countries and 10-15 per cent in developing countries, it would not be a reasonable policy to invest in mitigation projects yielding 1-2 per cent.
Proponents of normative approaches take it for granted that the social discount rate for selected public projects should deviate from the marginal rate of return on capital. The question remains: by how much? Proposals are ample and prescriptive discount rates usually range between zero and 1-2 per cent, but the underlying arguments are often inconsistent with economic theory. This is not the appropriate place to go into details of the debate. It is, however, important to note that several authors pointed out that artificially low discount rates in order to favor environmental concerns can backfire: reducing it to low levels would drastically increase investments that could lead to more environmental harm (e.g. Nordhaus, 1997) .
The present state of the discounting debate still poses the same old dilemma: we can attempt to be consistent with economic theory and empirical observations, but in this case most economists would argue that the derived discount rate will be on the order of 5 to 8 per cent. As a result, even possibly significant damages from climate change turn out to be negligible when considered at their present value. The artificially low discount rate based on ethical reasoning, on the other hand, makes our climate-related decisions and resource allocations inconsistent with the majority of other public policy decisions. Hence the search for alternative analytical tools to study the global warming problem and other long-term environmental issues is also justified by the difficulties of modeling approaches currently available. Those alternatives will be explored in the following sections.
From optimal decisions towards cost-effective decisions
The starting point of cost-benefit analysis is that social decisions should be based on individual preferences, which are revealed by agents through their behavior. However, as has been shown above, a large part of climate change impacts affects values for which no markets exist on which agents could express their preferences. Second, intertemporal decisions involving such long time frames as they are important for climate change are usually not made. And third, agents make no decisions concerning the international income distribution, from which their preferred global welfare function could be elicited. Accordingly, the approach of revealed preferences fails with respect to value judgments which have an enormous influence on the recommendations derived by a cost-benefit analysis on climate protection strategies.
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Most applied cost-benefit studies on climate change more or less try to bypass those valuation problems: damage cost functions are highly aggregated and analysts abstain from an explicit valuation of all damages; aggregation across agents in different countries is done as if the world were in a global welfare optimum; and discount rates often reflect a compromise between descriptive and prescriptive approaches. This might be regarded as a pragmatic attitude, but its reliability as a basis for decision-making is limited. Accordingly, many critiques start from the observation that they regard the thus derived policy recommendations unacceptable. Sometimes those critiques show that with different discount rates and social welfare functions the same models would lead to much higher optimal emission reductions, which they believe to be more appropriate. For example, Azar and Sterner (1996) show that with the assumptions that a CO 2 -equivalent doubling implies costs equal to 1.5 per cent of the income in both high and low income countries, a pure rate of time preference equal to zero, and a utility function which is logarithmic in income, marginal damage cost of CO 2 emissions would be approximately 50-100 times larger than those calculated by Nordhaus (1994) with the DICEmodel. However, this often gives the equally unsatisfactory impression that uncertain input parameters are specified such that they lead to the desired policy recommendations. Now, it is certainly a valuable exercise to check whether there exists a reasonable specification of uncertain parameters that supports a policy which for some reasons is regarded as interesting. More generally, a central value of cost-benefit analysis is that it forces analysts to keep track of the assumptions and value judgments that go along with various policy options. However, for cost-benefit analysis as a decision-making tool it is essential that results are driven by inputs, i.e. the preferences of individual agents, and not the other way round.
One approach to deal with the a priori wide range of``reasonable'' specifications of damage costs, discount rates and social welfare functions is to explore mechanisms to elicit people's preferences on these issues. A good example for this is contingent valuation surveys, where people are asked directly for their preferences, e.g. their willingness to pay for intangible values like the preservation of endangered species. In principle, one could devise questionnaires to elicit in a similar way agents' long run intertemporal preferences for environmental goods and their preferences regarding the global income distribution. However, the results would obviously be only very vague, because the complexity of the questions stands in sharp contrast to the agents' very limited experience of making such choices. Therefore, the reliability to use thus derived parameter specifications as a central input into a cost-benefit analysis is open to critique.
More importantly, instead of trying to elicit people's valuation of intangibles, social welfare functions etc. and inserting this information into a cost-benefit analysis, one might ask them directly for their preferences regarding different International Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 988 climate change scenarios and corresponding protection strategies. Often, value judgments can be better made by specific choices over ultimate objectives rather than in the abstract. Accordingly, Nordhaus (1997, p. 327) 
has argued:
In general, targeted approaches will be more efficient ways of accomplishing long-term environmental or social objectives. ... Focusing on ultimate objectives has the advantage of showing tradeoffs explicitly, making the cost of violating a cost-benefit rule transparent, and allowing the public and policy makers to weigh the options rather than having technicians hide the choices in complicated and abstrusely argued second-best rules of thumb.
This points at the usage of cost-effectiveness studies, where optimization is confined to the abatement cost side while the quantification of damage costs is regarded as not feasible or not necessary. Hence, the search is after a costeffective path to reach a particular environmental target which has to be specified in advance. However, this immediately raises the question: what are those``ultimate objectives'' we should focus on?
In many studies on climate change, targets have been formulated in terms of greenhouse gas concentrations, in particular the doubling of pre-industrial concentration levels. Because climate change mainly depends on accumulated rather than annual emissions, the analysis of different options to reach a particular concentration target allows important insights to be gained regarding the optimal timing of emission reductions. However, concentration targets are not an ultimate objective for a climate protection strategy, and unless going further down the cause-effect chain towards the related impacts, the choice of a particular concentration level remains largely arbitrary.
This leads to the option of formulating climate protection targets in terms of temperature changes. Even though temperature is still a highly aggregated target level, it has not only direct effects on our well-being, but it is also closely related to some other issues of direct concern like agricultural production. Furthermore, the physics of how emissions translate into temperature changes are better understood than the causal chain between temperature changes and first order impacts. This makes temperature an enticing candidate for the appropriate level of target formulation, which has received considerable attention (e.g. WBGU, 1996 and 1997) .
In the context of this paper it is important to note that the use of temperature targets as a basis for a climate protection strategy involves some difficult value judgments regarding essential tradeoffs. Most obviously, this is so with respect to abatement costs. If the cost to prevent climate change were US-$1 only, probably everyone who regards anthropogenic temperature changes as negative would immediately set a target of zero temperature change. However, in reality such very strict environmental targets would be extremely costly (if feasible at all), and therefore a decision of how much of the present welfare shall be sacrificed for how much climate protection is inescapable, independent of whether this is done more or less explicitly in the framework of cost-benefit analysis or rather implicitly in cost-effectiveness studies.
Furthermore, temperature targets have to be set not only for a single point in time but for very long periods. This requires a specification of intertemporal Climate protection strategies 989 preferences regarding temperature changes, which is by no means trivial [6] . For example, it has often been noted in the literature that the vulnerability of human-managed systems to climate change decreases with increasing incomes (IPCC, 1996c) , in particular because the capabilities for adaptation improve. If we believe that global income and especially income in poorer countries is increasing, this might provide a rational to allow higher temperature changes as the world gets richer. On the other hand, one might object that with rising incomes environmental preferences will possibly increase overproportionally. Thus, the search for a temperature target has led us back to some principle difficulties of discounting. Similarly, regional temperature changes can differ considerably, and therefore one has to decide whether temperature targets shall apply to every region or only on the global average. This forces us to make interregional comparisons, which are also extremely important for the international negotiation process.
Despite the attractiveness of setting targets in the temperature space, decision makers are more interested in first-order impacts like agricultural production, habitat protection, flooding and similar impact categories as elaborated in detail in the IPCC (1996b) report. Therefore, it suggests itself to formulate environmental targets in terms of those impacts, rather than using the very rough proxy of temperature changes. However, with this decision we would buy a number of problems which go much deeper than the fact that the natural science of how temperature changes translate into first-order impacts and the extent to which ecosystems are able to adapt autonomously to a different climate are not very well understood. In particular, we would have to be much more explicit about tradeoffs and the value judgments involved in specifying those tradeoffs.
First, if we formulate targets in the impact space, we have to address the very controversial issue of adaptation through deliberate action by society. For example, an impact target which states that the flooding of a particular region should be avoided is relatively meaningless without an exploration of potential adaptation measures like the building of dikes. But what is the maximal height we want to accept for a dike?
West and Dowlatabadi (1998) provide a particular striking example for the potential importance of adaptation. They estimate that economic costs of sea level rise along the developed coastline of the US, which have originally been measured as the current value of property threatened, fall by around 70 per cent if adaptation measures including the abandoning of specific pieces of property are taken into account. Now, adaptation to sea level rise addresses only one important impact area, and there are others where adaptation is probably a much more intricate issue. Examples include adaptation in agriculture through the choice of different crops, adaptation to the spread of vector born diseases through extension of preventive measures like vaccination or behavioral changes, adaptation to higher temperatures through improved cooling equipment and also the relocation of the population of low-lying islands might be viewed under the heading of adaptation.
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Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 990 A further highly disputed area which one has to address explicitly if targets are set in the impact space are issues of interregional aggregation and compensation. This question arises already in a one country one good model. Let us choose a highly stylized example and assume the only effect of higher temperatures in a country was the shifting of agricultural production from one region to another, but overall yields would not change. Then the question arises to what extent we find these changes as compensatory to each other. In reality, things are of course much more difficult and the most controversial questions are those concerning the extent to which we allow compensation among different countries and compensation among different crops or ± more generally ± among different impact areas.
In fact, if one takes an anthropocentric perspective it is not even climate change impacts on natural ecosystems we are ultimately interested in but the extent to which those impacts affect the quality of human life. For example, a decrease in agricultural production can have particularly bad effects on poor countries, because their resources to compensate those losses through purchases on the world market are very limited. Therefore, it does not suffice to look at global agricultural production, or regional agricultural production, but one has to analyze how individual agents are affected.
Thus, on the search for better targets for a cost-effectiveness study, we have encountered more and more of the difficult valuation and aggregation problems which make a cost-benefit analysis so intricate. Accordingly, the question after the appropriate level at which the targets should be defined depends on where one is more willing to make compromises. At the one extreme, cost-benefit analysis emphasizes the consistency of policy recommendations with individual preferences, but has to make major compromises regarding the quantitative specification and aggregation of those preferences. Therefore, the failure of estimating preferences appropriately can easily lead to inappropriate recommendations. At the other extreme, if one formulates targets for a costeffectiveness study on a highly aggregated level like greenhouse gas concentration or temperature, one risks that essential impacts and tradeoffs are overlooked.
From cost-effective decisions towards guard-rails for decision-making
Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are both driven by the goal to optimize policy recommendations, the main difference being that the first is based on a quantification of all impacts and tradeoffs while the latter is open to qualitative reasoning in the search for an optimal target. However, for a very complex decision problem it may be a more realistic approach to only narrow systematically the choice set by excluding as many``bad'' choices as possible. This procedure has some similarity to the iterative elimination of dominated strategies in game theory. The hope is that the remaining choice set, whose borders can be called guard-rails, is relatively small, so that one can explore it for example through the comparison of different climate protection scenarios in Climate protection strategies 991 more detail. And even if one does not find the best alternative, one would at least be relatively confident that this failure does not lead to completely unacceptable consequences. This is the basic philosophy which underlies the so-called``guard-rail approaches'' (Schellnhuber and Yohe, 1997) such as the``tolerable windows approach'' (WBGU, 1996; To Âth et al., 1997) and the``safe emission corridors'' (Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996) , which have recently attracted attention as an alternative tool to support decision-making on climate protection strategies. Usually, the choice of the guard-rail approach has been justified by arguing that it has considerable similarity to the way politicians make decisions and by pointing to the problems of cost-benefit analysis. In the following, we shall proceed more systematically by exploring elements of a choice theoretic foundation of this approach and propose some refinements.
In microeconomic theory it is common to assume that individual preference relations are rational in the sense that they are complete and transitive, where completeness requires that any two alternatives can be compared and transitivity excludes the possibility of cyclical preferences [7] . Both assumptions are essential for cost-benefit analysis and its aim to identify an optimal decision by comparing the costs and benefits of all options, because with incomplete or cyclical preferences there may be sets of alternatives which have no best element.
Despite its widespread use, the completeness assumption seems questionable for very complex decision problems like climate change (for a deviation from the transitivity assumption see Fishburn, 1970) . On the level of individuals, alternatives may be extremely difficult to evaluate, because no common experience in choosing among them exists. This pertains in particular to preferences for intangibles, which have been shown to be very influential for the outcome of cost-benefit studies on climate change. Similarly, there may be important scientific aspects where the knowledge could best be described as complete ignorance, so that not even subjective probabilities can be attached to different outcomes. Furthermore, a benevolent social decision-maker may not be able to rank different aggregation rules for individual preferences, be it the functional form of the social welfare function or the discount rate. These problems may be so pertinent that even the most careful analysis will not alleviate them. In the following, we will therefore investigate how a decisionsupport tool could be designed for such cases where preference relations are not complete [8] .
Let us define X as the set of mutually exclusive alternatives from which society must choose. In the context of climate change, this could be the set of feasible climate protection strategies. The preference relation is not complete, because some (but not all) alternatives are not comparable. If there is no alternative x P X that is weakly preferred (and hence comparable) to all other alternatives y P X, optimizing behavior is not possible due to the incompleteness of individual preference relations.
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Journal of Social Economics 26,7/8/9 992 However, instead of looking for the best alternative one can still proceed the other way round and eliminate preference dominated alternatives, so as to minimize the remaining choice set. Yet, without a complete ranking of all alternatives and the mathematical tools of optimization, there is no straightforward way of doing so. One possibility is to repeatedly compare two alternatives to each other and, if they are comparable, to eliminate the preference dominated one from the choice set. This is very similar to the scenario approach for the selection of a climate protection strategy (e.g. Alcamo, 1994 ). Yet, if the set X of alternatives is large, this procedure to limit the choice set is extremely time consuming and unlikely to lead to satisfactory results. It would be more efficient to search for alternatives x P X which are preferred to a whole set of other alternatives. To this purpose, let us denote a set of preference dominated alternatives by W and define it as follows: for every y P W there is an x P X\W such that x 1 y. Based on the remaining choice set X\W , we can of course search for further sets of preference dominated alternatives. Accordingly, we use the subscript i to denote different sets W i of preference dominated alternatives and define them more generally as: for every y P W i there is an x P X\ i W i such that x 1 y. By iterative elimination of all preference dominated alternatives, we would ideally be able to identify an``optimal'' choice set V , whose elements are preferred to all other alternatives but non-comparable or equivalent to each other. More precisely, V is defined such that all pairs x, y P V are noncomparable or equivalent and there is no pair of x P V Y z P X\V for which z 1 x[9]. However, often practical difficulties will make it impossible to delimit the choice set that much.
The main problem, then, is the identification of preference dominated sets W i . A possibility which has been followed in climate change research is the search for critical impact levels (e.g. To Âth et al., 1997) , where an impact can be regarded as critical if it determines the preference relation even for relatively large perturbations of the other impacts and abatement costs. Such critical impacts which eliminate sets of preference dominated alternatives can be identified at different levels of the cause-effect chain of climate change. For example, there exists widespread agreement that some catastrophic scenarios like a shut down of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation, a run-away greenhouse effect or a disintegration of the West Antarctic ice shield are intolerable. These impacts are characterized by discontinuities in natural systems, i.e. the existence of thresholds beyond which expected damages increase dramatically. Therefore, a decision regarding the tolerability of a violation of such a threshold is relatively robust with respect to different valuations and aggregation rules for the impacts.
However, such thresholds in natural systems might not narrow the choice set sufficiently to provide enough guidance for decision-makers. Often it is not an individual impact but rather a vector of impacts and associated mitigation and adaptation costs which make a particular scenario critical. Accordingly, one would face again the difficulties of target formulation as discussed in the Climate protection strategies 993 previous section. But the compromises involved in this exercise may be easier to accept if the aim is not to identify an``optimal'' target for a cost-effectiveness analysis but only``minimum'' requirements for a decision. On the other hand, because those minimum requirements provide only necessary conditions for a choice, they are not sufficient for its tolerability. If decision-makers are not extremely careful, they might feel on the safe side when choosing an option inside the guard-rails, even though they are actually not, because some very severe impacts have been overlooked during the elimination of unacceptable choice options. Similarly, as the guard-rails represent only minimum requirements, they will generally be less strict than the optimal target and for this reason it is not admissible to use them straightforwardly as a target for a cost-effectiveness study.
An example of how unacceptable decision options can be eliminated on a relatively high level of aggregation is the formulation of constraints for the climate evolution by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 1996 (WBGU, , 1997 . The Council argued that most ecosystems as we know them today and other life-supporting environmental systems relied upon by humanity have evolved in the geological period of the late quaternary. According to this argument, dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system cannot be excluded beyond a level where human emissions force climate out of the range that characterized the late quaternary. The last interglacial maximum of the global mean temperature is estimated to be 16.1ëC. The Council added half a degree tolerance to that and defined the upper limit for global mean temperature at 16.6ëC. The second constraint on anthropogenic climate change, as defined by the WBGU, is derived from expert judgment. To allow natural and socioeconomic systems to adapt to changes in climate, the Council argues that the rate of change should not exceed 0.2ëC per decade, which according to the Council would correspond to damage cost of approximately 5 per cent of global GDP. Finally, it is assumed that emission reductions of more than 4 per cent per year are not socio-economically tolerable (see WBGU, 1997 for details) [10] .
The results are depicted in Figure 2 , where it should be noted that we are interested in emission trajectories rather than emission levels at a particular time point. All trajectories which lie at least in parts outside the shaded area violate one of the three constraints and, according to the arguments of the WBGU, lead to non-acceptable climate change scenarios. In the terminology introduced above, each of the three constraints delimits a set of preference dominated alternatives W i and the shaded area depicts the necessary conditions for an alternative to be a member of the remaining choice set X\ 3 i1 W i so that every emission trajectory outside the shaded area is preferred by at least one emission trajectory inside the shaded area. However, it should be emphasized again that, while the WBGU-criteria exclude unacceptable climate protection strategies, they say very little about the remaining choice set. In fact, the shaded area may include a number of strategies which are unacceptable according to other, not specified criteria.
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Despite those limitations, Figure 2 already provides important information for political decision-makers. For example, the results show that, given the WBGU climate window and the parameter specifications, the time span for which we can follow business-as-usual is absolutely restricted to about 20 years. Waiting 15 years without implementing emission reduction measures at all would lead to a large loss of flexibility for action to keep climate in the specified window.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have critically reviewed cost-benefit analysis, costeffectiveness analysis and the guard-rail approach as decision-support tools for the choice of climate protection strategies. The principle aim was to show the central role of value judgments for any of those approaches, thereby emphasizing three aggregation problems:
(1) valuation of uncertain environmental benefits from climate protection relative to other goods; (2) valuation of the consumption of the present relative to future generations; and (3) valuation of the consumption of``poor'' relative to``rich'' people.
These valuation problems are at the very heart of the climate change problem and there is no escape from them. Not only cost-benefit analysis, but also alternative approaches like cost-effectiveness analysis and the guard-rail approach ultimately have to face them. Indeed, if they did not, e.g. if a policy recommendation were said to be independent of how much we value the Necessary corridor of global carbon dioxide emissions (cf. WBGU, 1997) 7. Let X be a set of alternatives. A preference relation 1 is complete if for all xY y P X, we have that x1y or y1x or both. Similarly, a preference relation 1 is transitive if for all xY yY z P X, if x1y and y1z, then x1z (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . 8. It is important to note that non-comparability of two alternatives is different from positive indifference (= equivalence) between these two. To see this, consider a decision-maker who cannot compare alternative climate protection strategies x and y. Let z be a third alternative, which differs from y only in that abatement costs are US-$1 higher. Then y 1 z, and if x $ y by transitivity we would have that also x 1 z. However, if the decision-maker can not compare x to y, it is unlikely that he can compare x to a strategy z which is only marginally different from y (by US-$1). 9. Note that all elements inside the optimal choice set V must have the same preference relation to elements in the complement of V . By contradiction assume that for alternatives xY y P V Y z P X\V we have x 1 z but z 1 y. Then, by transitivity x 1 y, which contradicts that all pairs xY y P V are non-comparable or equivalent to each other. In other words, y can be eliminated from the remaining choice set V because it is preference dominated by x. 10. Further assumptions are: in the initial phase, global and regionalized emissions are following the IS92a IPCC scenarios. In a subsequent period when reduction takes place, all greenhouse gases (except CFC which follow the scenarios defined in IPCC, 1996a) and the SO 2 emissions are reduced in phase with CO 2 emissions. Furthermore, developed countries may reduce emissions long before developing countries are forced to do so. But as soon as the average``per capita'' emissions of both groups of nations are equal, developing countries reduce in phase with the industrialized nations.
